New Frontiers

Charlotte Tate: From the Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs at Middlebury College, this is New Frontiers. I'm Charlotte Tate, the Center's Associate Director. In this episode, Ambassador Michael McKinley joins Mark Williams to discuss foreign policy implications of the 2024 US presidential election.

Mike McKinley: If former President Trump were reelected, in the Middle East, Ukraine, on trade, migration, there’s a stark choice in terms of foreign policy.

Mark Williams: Foreign policy doesn't usually play much of a role in U. S. presidential elections, but the consequences of those contests can have profound effects on American foreign policy, and by extension, on US interests, allies, and other countries around the world. What then are the foreign policy implications of the 2024 election? To find out, I spoke with Michael McKinley, a former US ambassador to Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Afghanistan. Although we spoke before President Biden ended his reelection bid, with Vice President Kamala Harris atop the Democratic ticket and assuming her foreign policy would deviate little from that of the Biden Harris administration, Ambassador McKinley's insights remain instructive.

So to help understand what might be the future of US foreign policy, I first asked him to reflect on its past, specifically in what ways, if any, has US foreign policy changed over the last few decades?

Mike McKinley: The fundamental shift, I think, is pre 1989 and post 1989. The Cold War was the period from 1945 to 1989. And post 1989, there was the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of history, according to Francis Fukuyama, and a period in which the United States was seen as the sole superpower in the world. And when we were speaking about not a balance of powers, but the United States as preeminent.
Once 9/11 happened, there was a shift. After 2001, the United States increasingly focused on wars in the Middle East and South Asia. The term “Global War on Terrorism” was developed to describe that time frame, but it was also a period when much of the rest of the world was focused on other things. There was economic transformation underway that really has few parallels in history in terms of economic growth—hundreds of millions of people lifted into the middle class in China, India, Latin America, even sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

And post 1989, dozens of countries became democracies. And so you have these global transformations underway, not all of them positive. The emergence of a more belligerent Russia, the emergence of China as a strategic competitor on the global stage, in many parts of the world the emergence of nationalist and populist governments focusing inwards, defining national priorities in a different way.

The United States still very much focused on what it saw as fundamental threats to our national security. And then we have the election of President Trump in 2016 and what we saw in the four years of the Trump administration was a shift in that direction combined with growing concern about what was happening with Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere.

So what I've tried to outline for you is Cold War, post-Cold War, something else developing. We're now in that something else.

Mark Williams: So there's a long gestation period?

Mike McKinley: That is correct.

Mark Williams: To what we're currently experiencing, and to sort of encapsulate, perhaps, what you've said. After the end of the Cold War, there is this sort of Charles Krauthammer unipolar moment, and a perspective here in the United States that that unipolar moment could be extended, could be perpetuated. And after the 9/11 attack, there is a period where the United States at least is perceived to be acting in a much more unilateral fashion, although it did have partners in various ventures. And that unipolar focus persisted inside the United States policymaking circles, even as things outside the United States began to change politically, economically. Even as things changed, our vision and our foreign policy focus hearkened back to this sort of Krauthammer vision.

Mike McKinley: You're absolutely spot on. In fact, you said it better and more concisely than I would have. And so let me just riff on that a minute. Post 1989, that unipolar moment, was a period in which the United States could feel confident and even proud of what had been achieved. There was this momentous shift to democracies in the 1990s that people tend to forget now. But it was literally dozens of countries

Mark Williams: The third wave of democracy.

Mike McKinley: Absolutely. And we saw it in the central Asian states, the former Soviet Union states. We saw it throughout Latin America. We saw it in parts of East Asia. We saw it in parts of sub-Saharan Africa as well. So it did seem as the catchphrase of fighting for freedom and democracy was being given substance across that decade.

We saw a period in which free market capitalism certainly seemed to be embraced in every part of the globe, including governments that still called themselves communist or socialist. We saw a moment when multilateralism, the primacy of international institutions, the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, were being given credibility and standing on a global scale that perhaps they hadn't had quite the same way before and certainly don't have now.

And as the United States was moving forward, frictions were beginning to appear. There was this growing sensation of the United States, as you rightly point out, acting in a more unilateral fashion. But it didn't really become crystallized until we entered what was called the “Global War on Terrorism.” And I would suggest that it continued under a different name through much of President Obama's administration. And it was that period when you see the beginning of the fragmentation of what we thought had been achieved and would be long standing in the ten years after 1989.

Mark Williams: Okay. Thank you. One of the issues that has struck me is that there was a largely bipartisan foreign policy approach for a long time inside the United States. And one could count on certain constant regularities, certain policy objectives, certain ways about doing things and approaching foreign policy that were shared regardless of which party might have been in power. And now it seems as if bipartisanship in terms of foreign policy has gone by the way. I'm wondering if you think that's an accurate assessment and why bipartisanship might have gone by the way, if you agree that that's the case.

Mike McKinley: I agree completely. And I would suggest bipartisanship began to go out the window in the latter part of the first decade of the century. After the first few years of the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, we began to see a fraying of common political positions beyond our borders between our two major parties.

Before that, it was fairly clear what both parties stood for, even if tactically, they may approach the strategic objectives in different ways. But it was a network of strong security alliances, which were seen as keeping the United States safe, primarily NATO, but also the security relations with East Asian countries, like Japan and South Korea. And several others in fact. There was an emphasis on promoting democracy, human rights agendas, and the principles and concepts were agreed between both sides of the political aisle.
And we certainly had a commonality of vision in terms of the United States being open to trade and investment overseas. It was seen as a net positive for the United States, even if there were debates over the extent to which there should be that openness. But there was consensus that, on balance, these agreements were a plus for the United States. In the 2000s, the United States actually expanded the number of free trade agreements it had around the world. But with the 2008 Great Recession, there really was a change in assessments of what was good for the United States for our national economic security. And the debate really intensified on both sides of the aisle on what the value of trade internationally was on protecting employment in the United States.

And as the 2010s rolled along and certainly once the pandemic hit, a much greater concern about supply chains, dependencies of critical industries on inputs from abroad, and a growing sense, as the new economy, the digital economy, the green economy were developing, that critical minerals were everywhere but the United States. And the consensus on what was good for our national economy and how it related to the outside world began to go out the window. I think there was also a breakdown over what the point of some of these conflicts were. Were we into nation building? Should we be into nation building? Wasn't the purpose to address the threat of terrorism, and wasn't that being contained anyways? It's very easily forgotten. The United States across 20 years spent almost three trillion dollars in the Middle East wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Three trillion dollars.This was a very significant investment, which on balance did not bring a return. We've seen what happened in Iraq. We had the collapse of everything in Afghanistan with the triumph of the Taliban in 2021.

And so what I'm trying to suggest is over time, these questions were already being raised. And whether there was a need for reorientation. You throw into the mix, belligerent Russia and I repeat it but I think it bears repeating, and a rising China, and the complexity of opinions on what we should do and where the real challenges lay to the United States were debated much more openly and fiercely. People are offering different perspectives or rationales for what represents national security for the United States as we enter the second quarter of the 21st century.

And so, I think it's fair to say that there was a polarization developing in the United States from the late 2000s onwards and it's become ever fiercer and that spills over into politics. And we're seeing it in some of its crudest forms right now on this debate over assistance to Ukraine where there's senior informed senators and representatives arguing we shouldn't help a country that's been invaded by another country because it's not in our national interest. Which would have been an unthinkable position for most of the last 60 to 70 years.

Mark Williams: So if the United States has already moved beyond the bipartisan foreign policy consensus, what implications does the next presidential election have for the direction US foreign policy might take? I put this question to Ambassador McKinley.

Mike McKinley: We can't understand the moment we're in, we cannot project forward and speculate about what next year might look like, depending on whom wins, without looking at the last eight years. Without looking at the evidence. It's there. And so in the Trump administration, I think it's fair to say it was a more nationalistic foreign policy. “America First” was the catchphrase, but it emphasized national security by focusing on what was good for the United States first. And it viewed foreign policy with key allies, friends, even adversaries as transactional, and focused on what would be the benefit for the United States. There was significant pressure on allies in Europe through NATO and on Japan and South Korea to cover more of the costs related to defense in their regions and for their country.

And so that's a transactional element introduced to alliances which really hadn't worked quite on that basis before. And whether it was viewed as a correct way to balance responsibility for strategic relationships or not, it did shake up the confidence of our allies, both in Europe and East Asia, in terms of our staying power and our commitment to their security longer term.

If we take a look at how the Trump administration approached trade and investment overseas, we saw an essentially more protectionist approach adopted and with a view to renegotiating or ending trade agreements, which didn't benefit the United States more explicitly. Because of a view that other countries were benefiting more from these agreements or taking advantage of the greater openness of US markets.

And so we saw renegotiations of agreements with Mexico and Canada. We saw the abandonment of talks with European Union on a Transatlantic Trade Agreement. We walked away from the Transpacific Partnership, which would have established a broader free trade area with East Asia, a couple of Latin American countries, the United States and Canada, almost as a counterweight to China's influence in the economic sphere in that region. Because these agreements were all seen as damaging to US interests. When you take a look at how the administration approached multilateralism, it was essentially international institutions don't serve the interest of the United States. And so we saw the withdrawals from WHO, from the Paris Climate Agreement. And we also saw the withdrawal from some security agreements, whether they were Iran, on nuclear containment. But also walking back some of the agreements on nuclear containment in Europe with Russia. And the view again, was the United States needed to focus more on what it required for its own national security. So, if you want to shorthand it, there were results. Burden sharing did improve with allies. The trade agreements with Mexico, Canada, Korean were renegotiated. And in terms of international engagement, there was a focus on withdrawing from conflicts overseas. So, I don't want to paint an entirely negative picture, I don't think that's fair, but it definitely was more inward-looking foreign policy than we'd seen for the previous 60 plus years of United States history. It’s a walk away from internationalism from multilateralism, and more of a focus on narrow definition of protecting US interests.

Mark Williams: Given this assessment of US foreign policy under Trump, I wondered whether Ambassador McKinley saw the Biden administration’s approach as markedly different. In fact to a large extent he did.

Mike McKinley: The Biden administration came in and on the surface seemed to reverse all that. We rejoined all the multilateral organizations we had withdrawn from, strengthened our commitment to dialogue fora, like the Group of 20, of large global economies, the G7—the world’s, for the longest period, largest democracies and largest economies are grouped together to address issues touching on economics globally, but many others as well. We strengthened our participation in the UN again. We rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement. And in terms of the alliances, definitely a strong foot forward while still supporting the objectives of burden sharing, making clear our commitments again to NATO, to our East Asian allies, and redoubling the efforts to build security alliances, or at least agreements and commitments from partners in the Indo Pacific, which means everywhere from India to the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia. And certainly, in Europe post the invasion of Ukraine, revitalizing NATO to emphasize the importance of collective security in Europe in the face of what was, is still an aggressive Russia, which has its eye on more than Ukraine.
And in terms of outreach to other parts of the world, a significant influence on cooperation on transnational issues, like climate change, fighting pandemics, and so on. So the internationalist aspect versus the more nationalistic or characteristics of the Trump administration are what stand out.

Mark Williams: As of this recording, foreign policy issues have not figured prominently in either party's presidential campaign. And yet, given Ambassador McKinley's assessments, this election's outcome will likely have profound effects on the type of foreign policy the United States pursues, and in a world where foreign policy challenges abound.

Mike McKinley: Where we face the challenge in November is a choice between these different approaches. But in a world that doesn't stop changing. So we have the conflict in Ukraine, which is not ending anytime soon, and raising new questions about global rules of engagement. Are other international borders going to be respected? Is Ukraine creating a precedent for other nations to invade their neighbors, to change borders through violence? Is it in the United States’ interest to work with others on climate change, on the greening of economies, on regionalization of economic cooperation. For example, with the Europeans, on issues like cyber security, or the evolution to electric batteries. Or a more strategic approach to how critical minerals are developed. How we deal with semiconductors and moving away from the heavy dependence there is on Taiwan at this moment. Changing supply chain directions and the dependence on China. If former President Trump were reelected, there would be an effort to disengage from the strong support we've seen for Ukraine up to this moment. In the Middle East how the United States engages in the region will also be part of the discussion. On trade, it's very clear with proposals for 10 percent tariffs across the board. On imports into the United States, 60 percent tariffs on imports from China. Comments on migration, which will have a very significant impact on relations in the Western Hemisphere.

There's a stark choice in terms of foreign policy priorities going forward. And what's paradoxical is the United States throughout the 2010s, through and post pandemic recovery, continues to innovate, continues to be a world leader economically, continues to grow, continues to be the most important and strongest nation on earth in terms of military capacity. But it doesn't follow that we have that primacy that we had in the unipolar moment, or even the leadership role we had in the Cold War.

Mark Williams: Could we go back to these two different policy approaches? We have the “America First” approach, or the Trump approach. We have a more traditional approach. Is it your assessment that both of these approaches seek the good of the United States? Both seek to achieve the national interest? There's only a difference in terms of how to achieve those. What steps, tools, strategies one adopts in order to achieve basically the same thing. Or are we talking about policy approaches whose ultimate objectives, there might be some similarities there, but there are some important differences in the objectives.

Mike McKinley: I think there are, and I think again, you've crystallized this succinctly. Commonalities are, there's not a politician in the United States that doesn't support a strong, innovative economy that provides for the well-being of Americans, good employment, and can compete internationally. I think both Republicans and Democrats, in different ways support a modernized economy that can take us beyond. And so that's one element of continuity, and there's a recognition that it involves the outside world. But the question mark is the extent to which we should be depending on the outside world to respond to that.
There's a commonality of vision on a strong national defense, an ability of the United States to project beyond its borders, if necessary, if our national security is challenged. Those are two very important commonalities, which provide the framework for how the United States deals with the outside world.
So you can have the agreement on the 30,000 foot strategic picture, and then there's the day to day and the year to year of managing those principles in the context of a global landscape that is changing so quickly, and which posits challenges to how you defend those principles.

And so, as we look at what's happening post pandemic on the economic front, a lot of the rest of the world is now adopting a regional approach to economic integration. To some extent, certain regions are looking at establishing broader cooperation. We're seeing it in the East Asia Pacific region, to some extent in Latin America. We're seeing it how India approaches markets. So these changes are taking place and the United States has to think through how it responds to it, particularly as the concern remains over how China plays on the international stage. China is now the largest trading partner for over 100 countries in the world. And so deciding how to respond to this changing landscape really matters.

Mark Williams: In other words, the US is likely to follow a different path to address these challenges, depending on who prevails in the 2024 presidential election. As Ambassador McKinley explained

Mike McKinley: The Biden administration is placing a focus to the extent possible on reaching agreements on certain sectors, on certain approaches in Indo Pacific, reinforcing transparency and financing, freedom of navigation questions. The shifting of supply chains in a manner that benefits and concentrates in countries that are not in conflict with each other or with the United States. And I think it's fair to say that the Trump administration would go back to some of the principles it had pursued, which was renewing the focus on how much more can the United States do to build its own resiliency, its own capacity within its borders, and to continue to protect itself from unfair competition elsewhere. I don't think it's going to be so straightforward. Some of the broader issues are going to require more nuanced handling.

Mark Williams: Okay. Let's refocus on the domestic realm for just a bit. You had mentioned that you believe that there were linkages between the domestic political dynamics and our foreign policy. Would you like to elaborate a bit on what you see as domestic drivers?

Mike McKinley: Again, I'd like to put it in an international context, because if we take a look at the last X years, and put your date on it, whether it's 5, 10, 15, but certainly in the last 5 to 8 years. We've seen a wave of nationalist populist governments elected in the world. And we can point to other places, whether it's Hungary, whether it's Slovakia, whether it's India under Prime Minister Modi, some people would suggest Mexico under López Obrador, Brazil under President Bolsonaro, Boris Johnson in the UK, Giorgio Meloni as Prime Minister of Italy at the moment, but it is a very long list.

And so when we speak about what's happening inside the United States, looking inwards, a more nationalistic focus on what interests of a given country are. We're part of the world in that way, because it's a debate that's been underway for any number of years now. And the question is, how do you prioritize national interests in a manner that doesn't end up destabilizing the international environment in a way that can be harmful to you? That said, I would suggest in the United States, there's inward looking by both parties. So if you take a look at the wording of statements related to “America First,” but then you take a look at the signature catchphrase for foreign policy now, which is “foreign policy for the middle class,” the central elements are both a focus on economic security of the United States, security for Americans inside our borders. And then you get the differences in how you're going to do that. But 15 years ago, you wouldn't have defined foreign policy with any of those terms.

So we are now looking at a period, globally, where because of uncertainties, everything from pandemic to recessions, to wars, to the tech revolution, to climate change, go down the list. There is greater uncertainty among the peoples of many countries, including in the United States, about what the future holds and what the best response to meeting the challenges we face will be. Part of it is looking after your own. Because the concern is real, and it reflects itself at the ballot box and needs to be responded to if you're going to be effective.

Mark Williams: Whoever wins the election, one thing's clear. The next president is going to face some serious foreign policy issues, and among the most pressing will be how to respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and slow the deterioration of US Russia relations. As the ambassador sees things, the bilateral relationship was already strained. The invasion damaged it even more and raised questions of enormous importance.

Mike McKinley: So, we have the more existential question of why this conflict matters. The first point is that since 1945, countries don't invade other countries to change borders. It simply doesn't happen.
And one example of it happening, and there being an immediate international reaction, was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, which was reversed. There's also the impact the war has had on the global economy. It doesn't look like much, but we need to remember what happened in those initial months.
Russia with Saudi Arabia, probably, and I think one of two or three biggest oil and natural gas exporters in the world. Russia, with Ukraine, with Brazil, with the United States, to a lesser extent, Canada, Argentina, one of the biggest food exporters in the world. And as we look at the dynamic of this war, those early months, there was very serious concern about what would happen to grain supplies in countries like Egypt, the Horn of Africa, and so on.

And there was very serious concern about what would happen to energy supplies in our European allies. As we're looking at the global economy and the fallout of this war, we do have to worry about strangleholds being established over trading routes through the Black Sea, whether Russia decides what happens in the North Pacific is of greater interest in a military fashion sometime in the future. What happens with energy and food supplies through the Black Sea, what happens to Ukraine's production, and so on.
And so this is not neutral conflict in terms of its potential impact or importance to the global economy. And just because we've all adjusted doesn't mean that an outcome that results in a Russian victory is going to be good for the rules of engagement and transparency and global trade that we'd like to see. So I think it has that other element of importance for all of us.

In terms of the bilateral ties between the United States and Russia, they were under strain anyways, going back a number of years, following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, but what tipped things over the edge, obviously, was the invasion. In concert with our allies, we imposed the most significant package of sanctions ever imposed on a developed economy in history. By the way, Russia adjusted, and the sanctions have not had the impact on the Russian economy that was once anticipated. And so, relations, I would suggest right now, are at a very fraught point.

Mark Williams: Finally, is there anything specific that you look to that gives you optimism about the future of American foreign policy and reasons why we should be hopeful that we'll be able to navigate an increasingly complex world?

Mike McKinley: Well, I'm going to fall into the trap of we as a people are always optimistic. And even when we're being pessimistic, we're always looking for a solution, a way out, a deal. Something that works and can move things forward. And we're not conflict averse, but what we seek to is resolve conflict at the metaphorical level, at the political level, at the social level, and certainly at its crudest level in terms of international wars and internecine conflicts.

We've made many mistakes. We also have a pretty good track record across 60, 70 years in addressing conflicts. And I'll take, just recently, the mobilization of Europe and NATO against Russia. In four months, NATO was ready for what happened on February 24th, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and that was the product of US leadership.

The US is playing a leadership role in trying to address what's happening in the Middle East, an enormously complicated set of conflicts at the moment. And so, I'm a person who believes the outside world is going to touch us whether we want it to or not. And whether it's on the economic front, whether it's on wars that seem distant, whether it's on rivals that we see as eventually encroaching on us in some way, the best defense is an offense in terms of diplomacy, interaction, cooperation with the outside world.
It's not that a more inward looking or nationalist approach won't work for some time. But it reduces these challenges to formulaic concepts which don't fit. Ukraine is not just a war in Ukraine. It's a question about the sanctity of borders globally. So, we can withdraw from supporting Ukraine. It's not going to resolve the fundamental concept of the world order that's been called into question, which is, do countries respect each other's borders?

So as you look at the United States and the influence we still have, and you look at the scale of innovation and sheer breadth of our engagement across the world. I don't see us retreating from that kind of role completely.

Mark Williams: Very good. Ambassador Michael McKinley, thank you very much for taking time to visit with us here on New Frontiers. It's been a pleasure speaking with you.

Mike McKinley: It's been great speaking with you, Mark.

Mark Williams: Thanks.