New Frontiers

Charlotte Tate: From the Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs at Middlebury College, this is New Frontiers. I’m Charlotte Tate, the Center’s associate director. In this episode, Mark Williams and nuclear policy expert Stephen Herzog discuss why concerns over nuclear weapons and war have resurfaced 35 years after the Cold War, and how policies designed to reduce nuclear dangers can sometimes heighten nuclear risks.

Mark Williams: When the Cold War ended, the threat of nuclear war appeared to recede. But in recent years, this threat has returned, along with a growing recognition that some of the very policies designed to reduce nuclear risks can sometimes backfire, make tensions worse, or produce other unintended consequences. What drives this paradox, and what can policymakers do to minimize the risks?
To find out, I spoke with Dr. Stephen Herzog, a professor of the practice at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or CNS, at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey. In 2025, MIT Press published his co-edited book, Atomic Backfires: When Nuclear Policies Fail. And beginning in the fall of 2026, Stephen will be based in a new Vermont branch of CNS on the campus of Middlebury College. Our conversation took place before the United States, Israel, and Iran went to war in February 2026.
 Stephen Herzog, welcome to New Frontiers.

Stephen Herzog: Thank you so much for having me, Mark. I really appreciate it, and I'm looking forward to not only this conversation, but many conversations with faculty, staff, and in particular undergraduate students here on the campus to come.

Mark Williams: Welcome. We're glad you're here. When it comes to nuclear war or even a nuclear crisis, didn't the end of the Cold War let the world breathe a lot easier about these kinds of threats? Why, today, is there this growing concern about nuclear proliferation? And about the strategies we might adopt to prevent it or avoid other nuclear crises?

Stephen Herzog: During the Cold War, we had this period where in the 1980s there were up to 70,000 nuclear weapons, the majority of which were maintained by the Soviet Union and the United States. Also, of course, there were US allies, France and Great Britain, that had nuclear weapons. Israel had nuclear weapons. China, India. Pakistan would eventually get nuclear weapons after the Cold War. But there was a realization during the Cold War that nuclear threats were real. We had the Cuban Missile Crisis. We had a spate of movies during the 1980s that I think that many people have seen, whether it's War Games or The Day After.

And there was this whole of society understanding about nuclear threats and nuclear dangers. Here in the United States, I, being born in the eighties, haven't experienced it, but you know, my parents and probably you have experienced duck and cover drills related to nuclear weapons and nuclear war.
So when the end of the Cold War comes, we wind up with this situation where we have the so-called unipolar moment where the United States is the only superpower in the world. The first Gulf War happens and Russia–no longer the Soviet Union–is even, generally at least, tacitly supportive or doesn't interfere with what the United States is doing. And a lot of people in the world, given the state of the US unipolar moment, have felt like nuclear weapons, nuclear dangers, and these threats are no longer relevant to their lives whatsoever.

But what actually happened is even though the duck and cover drills went away, the unconstrained very vocal nuclear diplomacy and rivalry seemed to go away, the nuclear weapons themselves never went away. So the United States and Russia and other nuclear armed countries continued to maintain large nuclear arsenals. They spent billions of dollars on those arsenals, but publics weren't interacting with the nuclear threat anymore in the same way, despite the fact that there are weapons and war planning.

So we get to a point today where we have nine nuclear armed states in the world. And about 12,000 nuclear weapons in the world today, which is still a massive number, enough to destroy the world-over many times. And in the context of the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made a dizzying number of nuclear threats using nuclear weapons as a shield, essentially to enable Russia's war against Ukraine and to keep the United States and other NATO countries out of the conflict.

This has been really terrifying for a lot of people because younger generations haven't really interacted with nuclear weapons before. They may have seen Donald Trump making threats against Kim Jong Un on X or something like that. But the actual concrete number of threats and media attention given to Russia's behavior is something new. And older generations haven't had to interact with nuclear weapons for decades upon end.

So I think it's this. It's not that things are changing. It's that we're paying more attention. And nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence never went away. Because nuclear threats are what underline nuclear deterrence, but now we're paying more attention because of what Putin is doing. And what I believe Vladimir Putin has done in the context of the war in Ukraine is kind of said the scary bits and pieces of nuclear deterrence theory out loud, that for a number of decades after the Cold War were reserved for technical discussions among bureaucrats and experts. So they're now back in the public domain and people are worried about that.

Mark Williams: The scary parts being,

Stephen Herzog: The scary parts being that the practice of nuclear deterrence and maintaining large arsenals is the idea that I will point weapons at you if you don't attack me, and that will work on a reciprocal basis.

Nuclear deterrence is fundamentally a game of hostage taking where every city, major city in the United States is about half an hour right now away from being destroyed by Russian or Chinese weapons. And the same goes for these countries. That's not something that people around the world think about.
Now, the second part of your question is about nuclear proliferation and why are we worried about countries potentially developing nuclear weapons today? And I think there are two reasons for this. One major one is the lessons of the war in Ukraine: That Ukraine was a country that had a large post-Soviet inheritance, gave up that arsenal and the ability to have nuclear weapons, wound up getting invaded. Same thing happened to the dictators in Iraq and Libya. Both Saddam Hussein pursued nuclear weapons during the eighties and Muammar Gaddafi pursued nuclear weapons for a lot of the nineties and into the early two thousands. Both gave them up. Wound up being invaded.

So the war in Ukraine in that history has a lesson. And that lesson might be that only nuclear weapons can guarantee one’s sovereignty, and countries want to avoid the fate of Ukraine. That also dovetails with the current Trump administration and concerns that US reassurance and security assurances to its allies in Europe and East Asia may not be as firm as before. So as nuclear threats grow in the world, as countries without nuclear weapons feel less protected, they too may consider nuclear proliferation.
Mark Williams: Your book is all about the unintended consequences that come from states adopting the types of nuclear policies that they do. And this focus made me wonder about the menu of options that leaders have to select a nuclear policy in the first place. Is this a fairly broad menu? Is the list of options expansive or is it more limited?

Stephen Herzog: I think that leaders around the world have a large number of options they can use to respond to nuclear dangers in the world. So if we were to talk about like nuclear proliferation and the spread of nuclear weapons, there are things you can do on both the demand side and the supply side. On the demand side, to think about countries’ incentives for developing nuclear weapons, you can provide them with security assurances. On the supply side, you could have international sanctions, you could have export controls.

As far as dealing with proliferation, too, there's ways to incentivize countries to not develop nuclear weapons with specific financial incentives, nuclear energy guarantees. And then there are things like forceful counterproliferation in the US, and Israeli strikes on Iran's civilian nuclear program. So there really are a wide range of ways to deal with nuclear threats at all levels of the process.
Mark Williams: Okay, so we're talking about policymakers facing a fairly robust or a fairly wide list of options. And given that, what are some of the most common policies that states typically adopt to address nuclear dangers?

Stephen Herzog: One of the most common things we see are international sanctions. International sanctions are used against countries that are thinking about developing nuclear weapons, that have illicit nuclear weapons programs. They're also used against countries that make nuclear threats. So international sanctions are something we use all along the way.

International agreements too. So we have nuclear arms control agreements; for example, lots of trade control agreements between countries that deal with nuclear technologies, missiles, and other goods that you might not want to see disseminated around the world.

Mark Williams: So sort of the supply side, right? The supply side angle you were discussing before. How effective are these strategies that you mentioned? Do they typically achieve their intended goals? Are the consequences of adopting these strategies generally good ones?

Stephen Herzog: So I think that's a really interesting question. And the fact is, is that today we have nine nuclear armed countries in the world. And if you look back to what President John F. Kennedy said during debates when he was running for election, is that he predicted that there might potentially be 15, 25, potentially dozens of countries with nuclear weapons. Today we have a lot fewer countries with nuclear weapons than John F. Kennedy was predicting in the 1960s.

And nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. So all in all, I would say that the international policies that we have, have done a reasonably good job about constraining nuclear proliferation and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. But this doesn't mean that they are always successful.
There have been a number of cases in which countries have made overt nuclear threats. And where it's come down to a matter of sheer luck or individual decision making that nuclear weapons haven't been used.

Mark Williams: On the other hand, to go back to a point you had made earlier, President Kennedy was anticipating a fairly large number of states developing nuclear weapons. And if we think about the sort of self-help nature of the international system, there's a strong incentive for states that have the capability to develop those types of weapons to do so given their need to protect themselves. And so I'm reminded of the efficacy of some of these policies that you were talking about in sort of providing incentives not to do that when anarchy would suggest it's probably in their self-interest to do so.

Mark Williams: One major claim that your book makes is that efforts to minimize the risks of a nuclear crisis might actually escalate it instead. Could you walk us through that paradox?

Stephen Herzog: Absolutely and I appreciate that question. So the book is called Atomic Backfires, and what we're talking about is how well-intended nuclear policies may fail. And we're talking about unintended or counterproductive consequences. The point is this standard playbook or toolkit of well-intentioned nuclear policies are often policies that we think are winners. They're the things that seem most intuitive when a problem comes up in the world.

So, let's say sanctions. If a country is considering developing nuclear weapons you might levy sanctions upon them. Well, those sanctions may make it more difficult for that proliferator to acquire nuclear weapons or get certain technologies, which may be seen as a good thing or as a deterrent.

But if they cause the proliferator to want to do things internally to indigenize the supply chain and the pipeline for developing nuclear weapons, it will be more difficult, right, to identify what they're doing. Another example is, if you have a nuclear crisis between states. Oftentimes leaders like to make personal threats and they like to try and humiliate their adversaries and cause them to back down.

Well, they may well trigger honor and reputation concerns and other states that wind up exacerbating the crisis. So a lot of the nuclear policies that are first order preferences provide what may seem to be easy or cheap wins, but sometimes they lack the foresight of the long-term consequences.

And so in our book we take a historical approach and look at how a lot of these easy wins in the long run can actually make things worse. The book fundamentally is a call for enlightened political leadership and thinking and analysis that goes beyond looking at easy policy wins and thinks about long-term consequences.

Mark Williams: Could I ask you about diplomacy and diplomatic solutions to some of the nuclear concerns that leaders have? States have used diplomacy to broker arms control agreements. Isn't this an effective way to reach agreement that leaves everyone better off? Are there any downsides in your research that you've discovered to negotiated arms control treaties?

Stephen Herzog: So I think it's a great question. In the book we look at three ways that there can be unintended consequences of these treaties. This is not to say that arms control treaties don't work or that they're bad because they're oftentimes good, but there are three mechanisms in which they can actually backfire. The first is in the past when countries were pursuing nuclear arms control treaties, they often have pushed to have limitations or controls over things that they are weaker in. So by trying to include and exclude certain systems, arms control has sometimes been a game of competition and advantage seeking.

Mark Williams: Could you give us an example of that?

Stephen Herzog: So one of the chapters in our book is by James Cameron, who is a professor of history at the University of Oslo. He looks at the Strategic Arms Limitation talks, which culminated in 1972. And before that, during the negotiations the United States tried really hard to not include multiple warheads or MIRV, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. And they thought, we're really ahead of the Soviets as far as MIRV, we're going to make sure these are not in this treaty. And so they were ultimately successful in doing that.

Well, after the treaty came about, the interim agreement of Salt One, the Soviets said, well, MIRVs are not included in the treaty, so we'd better build them out. And as it turns out, the Soviets were really great at building MIRV. And the United States started to feel like maybe they were falling behind in their nuclear capabilities and the competition had been compromised. And this made it more difficult to have future arms control agreements in the near term because of the race for MIRV.

Another one that Professor Rebecca Davis Gibbons from Southern Maine University talks about in our book is the idea of payoffs to hawks. And this is what I would say, when President Barack Obama negotiated the New START treaty with Russia, he needed to get US Senate approval and a two thirds majority. And there were a number of arms control hawks, conservatives in Congress and the Senate who did not want to approve this. And in order to get the treaty, in order to vote for it, they required that the Obama administration pour tens of billions of dollars into modernization of the US nuclear triad and future nuclear systems. And what this does is it results in a level of modernization that comes alongside nuclear reductions, which promotes again, arms racing and makes it difficult to get future agreements.

And the last mechanism I'll say is my own chapter, which is about the multilateral dimension. And many people will know that there's a treaty called the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It's a multilateral treaty. There are more than 180 countries in the world that are a party to this treaty. It's been around since 1996. So this is 30 years since the treaty was negotiated. But there's also been a lot of talk from the Trump administration and the Putin administration about restarting nuclear weapons testing. And the reality is that the United States and Russia aren't party to this treaty, which hasn't entered into force. And the problem is this, when you have a big multilateral treaty that you want to use to control nuclear risk, country's fear being asymmetrically constrained. And so what they do is say, I won't join this treaty unless my adversary joins the treaty. And so what happens is the entry into force language for the treaty to become part and parcel of the body of international law normally says that you need so many countries to join this treaty before it can become international law.

In the case of the test ban treaty, it ballooned. There are 44 countries that each individually have to join that treaty before it can enter into force. So right now, nine of those countries have not joined. Each of them can exercise a veto over the treaty entering into force. So you get into this situation where you would hope that cooperative arms control can limit nuclear dangers, but if you negotiate the perfect treaty and you have every country in it that you would ever want to have in it, it may never wind up entering into force. So sometimes perfect is the enemy of the good.

Mark Williams: Is that the case with the Obama administration?

Stephen Herzog: I would say with the Obama administration and the New START treaty, I don't think it was a case of perfect was the enemy of the good. Not for that, not for the Iran nuclear deal. I think these were well negotiated agreements with strong verification. But there has been a new problem in the United States that scholars of American politics are particularly interested in. And that is that back in the seventies, eighties, nineties, when you would have votes in the US Senate on arms control treaties, they were near unanimity. The water's edge as they used to say. But today, arms control has become part of political polarization in the United States. The vote on the New START treaty was 74 in favor and 20-something opposed. I think there were a few abstainers. But the point is, is that I don't think perfect is the enemy of the good. I think that arms control in the US domestic political context has become caught up in politics.
Mark Williams: Let's shift gears and talk about the Center for Nonproliferation Studies itself for just a bit. You're a professor of the practice at CNS. Broadly speaking, can you help us understand what kind of research CNS actually does and what types of activities you'll be involved in once the Vermont branch is up and running?

Stephen Herzog: I am delighted to answer that question. CNS out in Monterey is part of the Middlebury family. We are the largest non-governmental research institute in the world dedicated to nuclear nonproliferation. Our headquarters is in Monterey, California. We also have a Washington, DC, office, and we have an office in Vienna, Austria, called the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation.
We have dozens of experts who work on a range of different issues. They look at commercial satellite imagery to track developments around the world related to nuclear proliferation, missile proliferation, and nuclear crises. They work on artificial intelligence and its intersection with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. They work on research security and thinking about protecting vulnerable industrial pipelines so that they're not exploited by actors to develop weapons of mass destruction. They work on the design and implementation of treaties. So we are actively involved in a range of research–everything from applied policy research related to nuclear weapons, to consulting and advising with governments and corporations around the world, and we do academic research too. I myself do a lot of research on nuclear diplomacy and arms control design. I look at public opinion on nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence. And so that's what we do as far as our research activities.

Mark Williams: You do that in all of the branches. You do that in California, you do it in DC, and you do it as well,

Stephen Herzog: We do it in all the branches, but there's a different flavor to each one of our branches. Monterey, California, has for a long time been our headquarters. It is the core of our institution, and we do policy and academic research there. In Washington, DC, we do both of those things, but we also do a lot of work on applied policy analysis. We do work with federal government grants. We have think tank events in Washington, DC, and play a very active role in the policy community.

In Vienna, the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, our office maintained there is right next to the Vienna International Center where the United Nations office in Vienna is, which is the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization.
As far as what will happen here on this new campus, our new office in Middlebury will be dedicated to teaching and research. We will work with students by having curricular offerings related to weapons of mass destruction, nonproliferation, and artificial intelligence emerging technologies. So students will learn about technologies. They'll learn about strategy related to them. They'll learn about ways to control these technologies and their broader effects on the international system.

Mark Williams: Sounds very exciting. I'm sure that students are going to be very interested in engaging with the center once it opens up.

Stephen Herzog: In addition to the actual curricular opportunities that I talked about, we plan to offer professional opportunities as well. Opportunities to work on policy writing, so op-eds and learning how to write policy memos for government and international organization positions, and opportunities for research assistantships directly with the Center.

I would love to have a course where we focus on international institutions related to weapons of mass destruction, and we take students to our Vienna office and our base there. And we meet some of the experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. And we talk to them about, what's it like to do an inspection on a potential proliferator territory? What is looking at satellite imagery like? What are you looking for? And what are career opportunities that students can have in the long run in this field?

Mark Williams: Sounds like a class I would've enjoyed taking as an undergraduate. Throughout the Cold War, Stephen, and even today, the United States has helped provide security for its friends and its allies. And for some countries, Japan, NATO states, and a few others, that's included giving them a nuclear umbrella, by which we mean using America's nukes to deter an attack on its friends and allies. You've touched on this before, but how would you assess the overall utility of nuclear alliances?

Stephen Herzog: Nuclear alliances have historically been one of the great tools of nuclear nonproliferation for a few reasons. First, US presidents consistently articulated that they had ironclad security assurances for US allies. Second, the United States forward deployed, as we say, nuclear weapons on the territory of its allies to be delivered in crises. And today in Europe and a number of countries, there are actually US tactical nuclear weapons that if the United States presidents authorized them, they would be released from US custody and be delivered by European NATO states in a crisis. And the third thing, the United States deployed so-called tripwires around the world. A tripwire is the idea that you have this small contingent of US forces and their families based abroad that, heaven forbid, if there's a conflict they would unfortunately be killed or harmed, and that would provide the moral weight on the US President to respond. So it's a very scary and very serious situation.

I think that all three of those things right now during the current administration may be under threat. We have a US president who has consistently said that the United States might not be willing to defend certain friends and allies, and has also said maybe it would be good if certain countries like Japan and South Korea develop nuclear weapons of their own. That raises questions about whether the United States is going to continue to be committed to these countries in the future, which is why politicians in places like Poland, Germany, and South Korea, are talking about proliferation. The other thing the Trump administration has talked about is drawing down forces around the world. This might be a way to unravel the so-called tripwire mechanism. And then the last thing, if the United States has a future arms control agreement with Russia that substantially reduces US nuclear weapons, the biggest critics of this potentially working out in the future that I've seen, are actually some of my colleagues from Europe, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Their fear is that the United States might engage in a cooperative agreement with Russia or maybe even China, that involves downsizing its nuclear arsenal in a way that undermines the assurances provided to US allies.

What the war in Ukraine has showed us over the past few years is that when there are questions about the willingness of the United States to defend its allies, the response of US allies is to consider potentially developing nuclear weapons of their own.

Mark Williams: Are there any particular parts of the world where you believe we are more likely to see nuclear proliferation down the line? Any regions or countries where we might see this?
Stephen Herzog: It is unlikely at this point, but I think that if US security assurances are rescinded or waiver in the future, the odds that a country like South Korea, in particular, may develop nuclear weapons are probably about the highest that we could see in the world.

The second thing that I would say is right now we see a massive spread of civilian nuclear energy is going to be on the horizon. It's going to be on the horizon to deal with climate change. It's going to be on the horizon to help countries gain energy independence, and it's going to be on the horizon to power the AI data centers of the future. The supplier of civilian nuclear energy matters.

And historically, in order to get civilian nuclear energy from the US, you have to take on certain nonproliferation measures. Right now, the world's largest exporter of civilian nuclear energy is Russia. Russia does not require that countries take on the additional protocol for more stringent inspections with the IAEA. This has included Belarus and Egypt, a country that in the past was found to have missile materials that were not in line with its declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency. On the horizon, too, is China. China is quickly developing nuclear power plants domestically at a pace which is unprecedented in world history. It is believed that in the next few years, China will then turn to be an exporter. And it's unclear what China will do as an exporter as far as nonproliferation.

So I think the two biggest cases for proliferation that we see in the future are countries under the US nuclear umbrella that feel threatened and no longer feel safe by what they view as receding US commitments, and the potential spread of civilian nuclear energy technology around the world without proper nonproliferation safeguards.

Mark Williams: Can we go back for a minute, to that menu of options that states have when selecting a nuclear policy? Given the gravity of nuclear weapons, to what extent is the standard toolkit of options based on strong evidence or robust research findings?

Stephen Herzog: I don't think that the standard toolkit is based on strong evidence or research findings. It's based on the idea of what is cheap, easy, and what is perceived to work. If you see that a country is potentially developing nuclear weapons, it's a lot easier to levy international sanctions on them than it is to invade the country, for example. There are just some policies that are more popular than others because again, they're cheap and they're seen as easy wins.

Mark Williams: Stephen, looking ahead do you think that there are things that can be done to ensure that leaders have a broader set of options they can choose from when designing nuclear policies? What are some of the most practical paths toward that outcome, do you think?

Stephen Herzog: Some of the most aggressive and unrestrained policies have had the highest propensity to backfire. So one of the things this book is arguing for is more diplomacy, more engagement, more time to let things unfold till you can actually see where everything is headed. And to avoid making rash and hasty decisions to pursue policies would seem like the easiest option. It's not easy. Politicians have incentives to make their constituents happy. They have electoral incentives. But we hope the stress that the overall dangers of nuclear weapons that the world faces are too important to be held captive to this type of domestic politics.

I would like to see President Trump make an enlightened case. Think about long-term nuclear weapons policies that may not be politically popular, but may make the United States safer in the long run, rather than just quickly pursuing things which look good and help rack up some political points.
Mark Williams: How do we get leaders to think differently and to be more serious about nuclear policy?
Stephen Herzog: This is one of the most difficult questions that could be asked here. And so I would come to two answers, maybe neither of which is satisfactory. The first is legacy. And again, we want to talk about enlightened political leadership, about being willing to divert from the past trajectory of history.
And for President Trump, this is interesting because Trump in particular has said that he wants to be different than everyone else. He talks about all the failed American presidents and everything that they've done wrong from both administrations. My view is this. The policies that Trump has pursued, as far as sanctions, counterproliferation, and other things, sometimes part ways with those past leaders. But generally, there's been more continuity than change in President Trump's policy, despite the rhetoric which has been accompanied by it. If he wants to be a real leader in reducing nuclear dangers, I think it involves more foresight and thinking through some of these historical examples.

But the other point is, it matters who is providing advice to leaders. And that's what we think this book is about, on some level. We understand that there are nuclear dangers in the world, and that for more than 80 years, a series of generations have failed to eliminate the scourge of nuclear weapons from the world. What we hope is to get this book into the hands of people in the policy and the academic world, to get it into the classroom with undergraduates, into master's level programs for people who will wind up being the next foreign service officers, desk officers at the State Department, advisors at the National Security Council.

And you may not agree with us and everything that we say in this book, but we're just making an argument for a careful understanding, a historical rather than a historical analysis of cost and benefits and likely outcomes.

Mark Williams: Okay. So a lot then depends on getting the kind of information that you're examining in this book into the hands, and hence the minds of leaders and future leaders. The book is called Atomic Backfires: When Nuclear Policies Fail. Where can folks pick up a copy?

Stephen Herzog: Well, if you want to pick up a copy, it is available from any major bookseller. Amazon has it. But through a generous contribution by MIT Press Direct to Open, this book can be found available to read every single chapter for free on the MIT Press website. So just search for on Google “Atomic Backfires MIT Press Open Access,” and you will find it very quickly. And I think that MIT Press has done us a great favor and that they recognize and believe that this is a truly important book as far as its ideas.
I would love nothing more than if you are an undergraduate student who is interested in nuclear weapons to find this book for free on the internet, look at a couple chapters and just check it out. Skim the book and let us know what you think.

Mark Williams: Okay. So Amazon, bookstores, and going directly to MIT Press open access. Great. Well, this has been a really fascinating discussion and I want to thank you very much, Stephen, for coming in and visiting with us here on New Frontiers. Thanks so much.

Stephen Herzog: Thank you so much for having me, and I look forward to seeing you and others on campus next fall.

Mark Williams: This episode of New Frontiers was produced by Margaret DeFoor and me, Mark Williams. Our theme music is by Ketsa. If you liked the show, leave us a rating or review on Spotify, Amazon, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. This can help others to find us too. We’ll be back with another episode of New Frontiers. Thanks a lot.